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PELLEGRINO v. O'NEILL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Connecticut Constitution states: "All courts shall be open, 
and every person, for an injury done him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and 
justice administered without sale, denial or delay."! Connecticut en­
joys one of the highest per capita income levels but suffers from possi­
bly the longest civil trial delays, and lowest ratio of trial judges 
available for trial, in the country.2 Why one state encompasses both 
statistics is a complex question. The question formed the underlying 
basis for the claim asserted in Pellegrino v. O'Neill. 3 
In Pellegrino, thirteen plaintiffs awaiting trial on civil actions in 
the superior courts of the judicial districts of Hartford, New Haven, 
Bridgeport, and Stamford brought suit against Connecticut's Gover­
nor, treasurer, comptroller, chief court administrator, speaker of the 
House of Representatives, and President of the Senate.4 They claimed 
that the delay in the specified districts5 denied the citizens of the state 
of Connecticut an adequate means of redress for their civil claims. 6 
They cited insufficient appropriations as the cause of the delays, 
sought a declaratory judgment finding the financing of the judicial sys­
1. CONN. CONST. art. I § 10. 
2. In 1983 Connecticut ranked second among the states in per capital income. 
NEWSPAPER ENTERPRISE ASS'N, INC., THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 
1985 168 (1984) (quoting statistics derived from the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis). At the same time it ranked 48 out of 50 in per capita expenditure on 
its judicial system. McCollum, Court Backlog Termed One ofthe Nation's Worst, Hartford 
Courant, Dec. 18, 1983, at AI, col. 1. Additionally, the state was third from the bottom in 
a survey of 19 states measuring the number of full time judges per capita. McCollum, 300 
Cases Being Sent to Rural Courtrooms, Hartford Courant, Oct. 18, 1983, at AI, col. 5. In 
1983 delays approached 6 years in the civil system. Average delays in New Haven County 
were 5 years 9 months; in Bridgeport 4 years 9 months; in Stamford 5 years and 1 month; 
and in Hartford 5 years. McCollum, Backlog Prompts Lawsuit, Hartford Courant, June 17, 
1983, at C1, col. 1. In comparison to counties of similar size, San Mateo County, Califor­
nia, and Hampton County, Massachusetts, delays lasted 5 Y.l and 17 months respectively. 
Id. 
3. 193 Conn. 670, 672-73, 480 A.2d 476, 478 (1984), cert. denied and appeal dis­
missed, 105 S. Ct. 236 (1984). 
4. Id. at 672, 480 A.2d at 476. 
5. The claimed average delays varied between 5 years 9 months and 5 days to 4 years 
9 months and 9 days. Id. at 672-73, 480 A.2d at 478. 
6. Id. at 673, 480 A.2d at 478. 
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tern unconstitutional under both the state and federal constitutions, 
and requested ancillary injunctive or equitable relief.7 The trial court 
dismissed the claim as nonjusticiable. The state supreme court defined 
the issue as the adequacy of the number of superior court judges ap­
pointed by the legislature rather than the funding of the judiciary by 
the legislature.8 The supreme court held that the trial court would 
have violated the doctrine of separation of powers had it directed the 
legislature to appoint additional trial judges and agreed that the issue 
was nonjusticiable.9 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. The Power of the Court 
The Connecticut judiciary possesses the inherent power to direct 
governmental agencies to provide the funds necessary "for the reason­
ably efficient operation of the courtS."1O The court in Pellegrino 
aligned Connecticut with the states holding that their constitutions 
place a duty upon their judiciaries to insure that their legislatures do 
not infringe upon individual rights and liberties by refusing to appro­
priate necessary funds. 11 The courts base their reasoning on the prem­
ise that the legislative power to appropriate funds potentially can 
undermine the autonomy of the judiciary.l2 The judiciary, therefore, 
in order to insure individual rights and liberties, must possess the abil­
ity to appropriate adequate funding. 
The power to appropriate is limited. If the judiciary overreaches 
its constitutional mandate, the judiciary itself violates the doctrine of 
separation of powers. 13 The rationale of the power lies in maintaining 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. See id. at 671, 678, 480 A.2d at 477,481. The court, in finding that it possessed 
both inherent and statutory power to increase judicial funding in appropriate circum­
stances, concluded that the real issue concerned the adequacy of the number of judges 
appointed by the legislature. The court's deduction must have been premised either on the 
a perception that increased funding would not render the state judiciary more efficient or 
that the status quo did not warrant the use of emergency powers. 
10. Id. at 675, 480 A.2d at 479. 
11. Id. at 675-76, 480 A.2d at 479-80; State v. Staub, 61 Conn. 553, 23 A. 924, 926 
(1892); Commonwealth ex. reI. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 56, 272 A.2d 193, 199, cert. 
denied 402 U.S. 974 (1971). For a list of states with the position that the court possesses 
the inherent power to order payment of expense "necessary for its efficient and effective 
operation," see Annot., 59 ALR 3d. 569 (1974). 
12. Comment, The Court's Inherent Power to Compel Legislative Funding 0/Judicial 
Functions, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1687, 1700 (1982-83). 
13. "The failure to recognize [the court's] limit by continuing to disguise the ultimate 
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the viability of the judicial system, not in providing the most efficient 
system. 
The Pellegrino court, in addition, found statutory authority for 
the judiciary to appropriate funds for a constitutionally adequate sys­
tem of justice. The court specifically cited CONN. GEN. STAT. section 
4-84, which limits the governor's use of emergency funds except those 
to be used "for the current expenses of any state court." 14 Other state 
statutes indicate that the judiciary may freely appoint its own clerical 
and administrative support personnel and that the executive must pro­
vide courts with convenient places to conduct the business of the judi­
ciary.ls The court concluded that the legislature recognized the 
court's inherent authority to require that the proper authorities fur­
nish funds. 16 Additionally, the court's logic is consistent with State v. 
Staub, in which the court held in 1892 that the judiciary can compel 
the comptroller of public accounts to perform a public duty in distrib­
uting money that the General Assembly has allocated to a specific . 
purposeP 
The doctrine of inherent power does not include the power for the 
judiciary to augment its numbers. IS If the judiciary could control its 
numbers and funding, no limitation to its potential power would ex­
ist. 19 Placing the power to appoint with the legislature, therefore, re­
mains a cornerstone of the constitutional scheme of separation of 
powers in Connecticut. 20 
issue can only erode both the constitutional system of separation of powers and the public's 
respect for judicial legitimacy." Comment, supra note II, at 1701. 
14. Pellegrino, 193 Conn. at 676-77, 480 A.2d at 480; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-84 
(1983). 
15. Pellegrino, 193 Conn. at 676-78, 480 A.2d at 480-81; CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 51­
51v, 27b, 27d (1983). 
16. Pellegrino, 193 Conn. at 676-78, 480 A.2d at 480-81. Interestingly, the primary 
statute forming the basis for the court's decision speaks to emergency situations, yet the 
court barely discussed the statute in the context of an emergency. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4­
84 (1983). 
17. State v. Staub, 61 Conn. 553, 569, 23 A. 924, 928 (1892). 
18. Pellegrino, 193 Conn. at 678, 480 A.2d at 481. 
19. Hazard, Comment: Court Finance and Unitary Budgeting, 81 YALE L.J. 1286, 
1290 (1971-72); see infra note 24. 
20. The Pellegrino court specifically referred to Brown v. O'Connell which held that: 
[T]he power to organize courts and appoint judges is conferred by special 
mandatory provisions, requiring direct action by the General Assembly, those 
powers cannot be delegated, and the appointment ofjudges, in all cases where the 
constitution has not been altered by amendment, can only be made by vote of the 
Assembly. 
Pellegrino at 678-79, 480 A.2d at 481, citing Brown v. O'Connell, 36 Conn. 432, 448 (1870). 
Pellegrino thereby reaffirmed the Brown court's conclusion that the powers, being of pivotal 
importance, can never be delegated. 
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B. Justiciability 
The Pellegrino court held that the trial court had not erred in 
holding the complaint nonjusticiable. The supreme court continued: 
Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy be­
tween or among the parties to the dispute. . . (2) that the interests 
of the parties be adverse. . . (3) that the matter in controversy be 
capable of being adjudicated by judicial power. . . and (4) that the 
determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the 
complainant.21 
The supreme court reasoned that the only solution that offered the 
plaintiffs practical relief would be the appointment of additional supe­
rior court judges. Additional appointments, however, would violate 
the third factor the court had delineated. 22 
The third factor flows from the doctrine of separation of pow­
ers.23 The Connecticut constitution strictly reserves the power of judi­
cial appointment to the legislature.24 The appointment of additional 
superior court judges, therefore, is a political question. The Pellegrino 
analysis, therefore, never reached the fourth question since the judicial 
appointment of more judges represented the only practical relief. 
21. Pellegrino, 193 Conn. at 674, 480 A.2d at 479 (citing State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 
109, 111-12,455 A.2d 304 (1982». 
22. The majority cited many federal decisions in which the issue was held to be non­
justiciable because the only solution was additional judicial appointments. Pellegrino, 193 
Conn. at 685, 480 A.2d at 484 (citing Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial Administration v. 
Massachusetts, 488 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974»; De 
Kosensko v. New York, 311 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 427 F.2d 351 (2d Cir. 
1970); Kail v. Rockefeller, 275 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); New York State Ass'n of 
Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
23. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,208-14 (1962) (dicta that political questions are 
nonjusticiable; held that reapportionment may be justiciable under equal protection analy­
sis). In Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., the court stated: 
The 14th Amendment neither implies that all trials must be by jury, nor guaran­
tees any particular form or method of state procedure. . . In the exercise of that 
power and to satisfy a public need, a state may choose the remedy best adapted, in 
the legislative judgment, to protect the interests concerned, provided its choice is 
not unreasonable or arbitrary, and the procedure it adopts satisfies the constitu­
tional requirements of reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard. 
284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931). 
24. The Connecticut constitution explicitly grants the judiciary the authority to cre­
ate additional superior court judges. It provides: 
The judges of the supreme court and of the superior court shall, upon nomination 
by the governor, be appointed by the general assembly in such manner as shall be 
prescribed. They shall hold their offices for the term of eight years, but may be 
removed by impeachment. The governor shall also remove them on the address 
of two-thirds of each house of the general assembly. 
CONN. CONST. art. V., § 2. 
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Once the court found a political question, the argument became circu­
lar, leaving no means of awarding practical relief. 
Justice Peters, dissenting, relied heavily on Horton v. Meskill. 25 
The Connecticut Supreme Court in Horton held that the legislation 
funding public schools was unconstitutional.26 The Horton court did 
not force immediate legislative action on school funding but allowed 
time for the democratic process to provide a constitutionally accepta­
ble solution.27 The court also stated that declaratory judgments were 
"peculiarly well adapted for the judicial determination of controver­
sies concerning constitutional rights and, as in these cases, the consti­
tutionality of state legislative or executive action."28 Justice Peters 
concluded that a declaratory judgment similar to that in Horton would 
appropriately settle the Pellegrino case.29 Moreover, she expressed 
concern regarding the logical juxtaposition of Horton and Pellegrino; 
that a right to public education was fundamental and subject to strict 
scrutiny while a right to a civil trial "without sale, denial, or delay" 
did not enjoy the same status.30 
In Horton, the court limited the use of declaratory judgments to 
cases involving threats to personal rights, justiciable controversies, ad­
verse interests, actual or substantial questions, or notice. 3 ! The Horton 
rationale presented a practical form of relief under which the court 
could construe the matter to be justiciable. Given the broad nature of 
the Connecticut statute that authorizes the superior court to render 
declaratory judgments and the favorable reading normally given to the 
non-moving party in a summary action, support exists for the Horton 
25. 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). Subsequent to the Pellegrino decision, 
Governor O'Neill appointed Justice Peters, who wrote the Pellegrino dissent, Chief Justice 
of the Connecticut Supreme Court. 
26. Id. The court subjected the legislation to strict scrutiny. 
27. In Horton the court stated that: 
In a case such as the present one, this circumstance [school funding] is of special 
importance because the court, mindful of the proper limitations on judicial inter­
vention, the problems inherent in the complexities of school financing and the 
presumption that other departments of our government will accede to this court's 
interpretation of the state constitution, may properly delay specific direction, af­ ,. 
fording time for corrective action and avoiding any serious interference with the 
performance of their respective instrumentalities, funds and property. 
Id. at 627-28, 376 A.2d at 365 (quoting Block, Suits Against Governmental Officers and the 
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1061 (1946». 
28. Horton, 172 Conn. at 626, 376 A.2d at 365. 
29. Pellegrino, 193 Conn. at 689-95, 480 A.2d at 486-88. 
30. Id. at 689, 480 A.2d at 486; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10. 

3!. Horton, 172 Conn. at 627, 376 A.2d at 365. 
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approach.32 
Justice Peters also focused on the concept of "emergency." She 
would not have read the complaint as strictly as did the majority.33 
She would instead have read the claim for relief narrowly to be for 
additional funding. She then would have agreed to hold, with the ma­
jority, that the power to fund inheres in the state judiciary when its 
ability to perform its constitutionally mandated duties were 
threatened. 34 Using this line of reasoning the court would have two 
forms of equitable relief in additional funding and a Horton style 
judgment. 
C. Alternatives to Judicial Appointment 
Substantial authority holds that the judiciary possesses no explicit 
or inherent power to appoint additional judges. The question then be­
comes whether any plausible alternatives exist to erode the Pellegrino 
holding. In reading the complaint "broadly," the majority found the 
problem caused by a shortage of superior court judges rather than a 
lack of money.35 Impliedly, the court concluded that the financial sup­
port which the superior court system received maximized their effi­
ciency. If additional funds could have helped, the logic of the majority 
opinion would have required the exercise of the inherent power of the 
court to force judicial appropriations.36 The exercise would also have 
fulfilled the third and fourth justiciability requirements of having a 
matter that can be adjudicated and for which the possibility of practi­
cal relief exists. 
The weakness of the assumption of efficiency makes the addi­
tional appropriation alternative plausible. The question is not whether 
money will solve the problem but whether additional funding will alle­
viate the congestion. Money alone will not suffice but in the larger 
cities "more money is plainly essential."37 
Another alternative would be the adoption of a subsidiary system. 
In Gentile v.' Altermatt,38 the court recognized no-fault motor vehicle 
32. Id. at 626, 376 A.2d at 365 (quoting Sigal v. Wise, 114 Conn. 297, 301, 158 A. 
891, 892 (1932». 
33. Pellegrino, 193 Conn. at 692, 480 A.2d at 488. 
34. Id. at 693-94, 480 A.2d at 488. 
35. Id. at 678, 480 A.2d at 481. 
36. Id. at 675, 480 A.2d at 479. The statement merely reflects the obverse of the 
majority's argument. Its extensive discussion of inherent power, however, strongly indi­
cated that if the court found that a lack of appropriations interfered with its ability to 
perform its mandated functions, it would act promptly. 
37. Hazard, supra note 19, at 1286. 
38. 169 Conn. 267, 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976). 
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insurance as an alternative remedy for the problems, "whether ma­
chinery of justice is so burdened that justice is, in fact, denied to 
many."39 The Pellegrino court found such an alternative not appropri­
ate since the complaint addressed "the need for increased judicial 
personnel. "40 
The Pellegrino court left unanswered the question of whether it 
could have issued a declaratory judgment to provoke a legislative re­
sponse. The court stated as a "general rule that what [courts] cannot 
enforce they cannot decree."41 A broader reading of the complaint to 
include all possible remedies, however, may have sharpened the focus 
of the alternatives. Indeed, the majority's interpretation of the com­
plaint formed the basis of the dissent. 
The Horton court broached the final alternative. It stated that if 
the legislature has failed in its "expressly mandated" constitutional 
duties, a court may properly attempt to provoke a legislative response. 
To accomplish the objective, the court may issue a declaratory judg­
ment and then "stay its hand to give the legislature an opportunity to 
act."42 The Horton approach resulted from its awareness that a court 
must minimize its intrusion into constitutionally mandated legislative 
functions. The Horton court specifically emphasized that courts 
should be extremely cognizant of the limitations of judicial 
intervention.43 
39. !d. at 308, 363 A.2d at 21. The court specifically focused on the congested condi­
tion of the civil courts as the underlying factor that made dismissal reasonable. Id. at 308, 
363 A.2d at 22. For a more complete discussion of the alternatives to the auto tort process 
see Bombaugh, The Department of Transportation's Auto Insurance Study and Auto Acci­
dent Compensation Reform, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 207 (1971). 
40. Pellegrino, 193 Conn. at 682, 480 A.2d at 483. Neither the drafter of the com­
plaint nor the local press read the complaint so narrowly. Wesley Horton, an attorney for 
the plaintiffs, said, "The whole system of financing our judicial system is unconstitutional 
. . . . The legislature hasn't passed a statute that adequately funds the judicial branch of 
government." Legal Attack Begins to End Court Backlog, Hartford Courant, August 23, 
1983, at B3, col. I. 
41. Pelegrino, 193 Conn. at 683, 480 A.2d at 483 (quoting Clarkes Appeal from Pro­
bate, 70 Conn. 195, 209, 39 A. 155, 159 (1898)). 
42. Horton, 172 Conn. at 651, 376 A.2d at 375. 
43. The Horton court stated: 

[T]his circumstance is of special importance because the court, mindful of the 

proper limitations on judicial intervention, the problems inherent in the complexi­

ties of school financing and the presumption that other departments of our gov­

ernment wi11 accede to this court's interpretation of the state constitution, may 

properly delay specific direction, affording time for corrective action. 
Id. at 627-28, 376 A.2d at 365. 
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III. CONCLUSION 

Connecticut faces a crisis in its judicial system. One of the 
wealthiest states should not have one of the most ineffective systems to 
redress grievances.44 
Mere delay can transform the civil system "into a nightmare of 
inefficiency and inequity"45 for the average plaintiff, who must "do 
without any compensation until the end of the trial."46 In the 
meantime living expenses increase and earning power decrease due to 
the injury.47 As a result, parties may not be operating at arm's length 
and insurers may be placed in a superior bargaining position.48 "Ex­
tended delay may vitiate the relief finally obtained, especially if money 
is urgently needed and the prospective recovery is the victim's sole 
financial asset."49 If delays affect negotiation of bodily injury claims, 
they also affect the substantive rights of the parties. The system that 
tolerates the delays is, therefore, perverting "business relations, labor 
management relations and international relations."50 If the parties 
can manipulate the system so substantially, a true emergency exists 
because the courts are not fulfilling their constitutionally mandated 
duties. 
In Pellegrino the court had an opportunity to comment and act 
on excessive civil trial delays. The court framed the issue so as to 
avoid alternative approaches such as the one taken in Horton. The 
44. See supra note 2. 
45. J.O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY 49 (1975). 
46. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT, THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS 
ADJUSTMENT 136 (1970); Franklin, Chanin and Mark, Accidents. Money. and the Law: A 
Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30 (1961). 
Supra note 45 at 140. Mary D. Pellegrino said of her seven year wait, "I don't understand 
the court system. . . . It just made me feel like my case was important to me and nobody 
else cared .... It makes you feel like the system only works for some people." McCollum, 
Court Backlog Termed One of Nation's Worst, Hartford Courant, December 18, 1983 at 
AI, 18, col. 1. 
47. See authorities cited supra note 45. 
48. Excessive delay may affect the insurers position in the litigation process. Delay 
impacts on accounting systems, for example, because loss reserves continue to earn interest 
prior to settlement. Another impact results in the decreased ability of plaintiffs to marshall 
their evidence as time passes. Conversely, insurers may argue that their file maintenance 
costs increase and that plaintiffs may use videotapes and depositions. Plaintiffs, of course, 
are caught between the concern about expense and the fact that they must prove their 
cases. Poor plaintiffs may have to accept a lower figure due to the cost of litigation, press­
ing medical bills, liens and pressure from collection agencies. Finn, Our Uncivil Courts: 
Where You Need a Strong Case and a Strong Constitution, Hartford Courant, January 29, 
1984, at N.E., 10, col. 1; O'CONNELL, supra note 44; Ross, supra note 45, at 139-40. 
49. Franklin, Chanin and Mark, supra note 45, at 30. 
50. Ross, supra note 45, at 136. 
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court, therefore, placed the burden of developing a solution squarely 
on the back of the legislature. Since the problem is political, and the 
court placed it on the body expressly responsible for it, the court chose 
an eminently safe position.s l 
Walter E. Paulekas 
51. In 1984, Connecticut courts' caseloads decreased slightly in part because the ju­
diciary had spent considerable effort on its own and with the legislature to address the 
problem. Hansen, On the Courthouse Steps, Connecticut Law Tribune, November 5, 1984, 
at I, col. 1; Smertanka, State Courts Manage to Reduce Pending Court List, Hartford Cou­
rant, July 18, 1984, at Cl, col. 1; Gombossy, Speziale Names Panel to Study Case Backlog, 
Hartford Courant, October 26, 1984, at C2, col. 2. 
